By Tariq Asad
(Pakistan News & Features Services)
The controversial boundary demarcation of the sub-continent in 1947 by Sir Cyrill Radcliffe germinated the seeds for unrelenting water conflict between the new-born states that have persisted till-date.
Awarding the Muslim-majority areas like Ferozepur, having headworks for Sutlej River, to India accrued aggression from her by blocking water flow into all the canals entering Pakistan on April 1, 1948.
Though a Standstill agreement was concluded between the two neighbours but India cropped out in a highly commanding position on water-front. The matter was resolved by the mediation of the World Bank in the form of Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) as India and Pakistan were given exclusive rights on three eastern (Sutlej, Ravi and Bias) and three western rivers (Indus, Jehlum and Chenab) rivers respectively.
September 19, 2020 marks the completion of six decades of the IWT, signed by the then President of Pakistan, General Muhammad Ayub Khan, and the then Prime Minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru, in 1960 at Karachi, under the auspices of the World Bank.
A terse treaty, with 12 articles and 8 appendices (A-H), provided a detailed framework not only for bifurcation of rivers but entails provisions regarding exchange of data, future cooperation, creation of Permanent Indus Commission, settlement of differences and disputes and its modification.
The treaty has shown remarkable resilience during three scores of its life as it sailed through the war period of 1965, 1971 and Kargil crisis (1999) besides numerous other diplomatic crises between Pakistan and India that abysmally hit the bilateral relations.
Nevertheless, India’s debatable and objectionable use of permissive features in Article III (2) that allows unrestricted use of western rivers’ waters to Pakistan besides permitting India the limited domestic, non-consumptive, agricultural and hydropower generation use has affronted the treaty provisions.
Violation from India has been seen, time and again, in construction of engineering works on Jhelum and Chenab in Indian Occupied Kashmir (IOK). Engineering works there are to be notified to Pakistan well before their initiation so that the design features be mutually agreed upon by the two states under the treaty provisions. Only the design provisions of Salall hydroelectric project were amicably settled in 1978 after some objections raised by Pakistan.
Bilateral diplomacy could not compel the two intractable Indian governments for stopping the construction of Baghliar and Kishanganga dam in 1999 and 2007 respectively.
Questions became differences in case of Baghliar Dam on the Chenab River with the unprecedented appointment of Neutral Expert (NE) under Article IX (2a). The NE resolved the matter in February 2007 such that a win-win situation appeared for both parties.
However, the filling of Baghliar dam gave a severe blow to Pakistan savage reduction of water flow from Marala headworks in September and October affected millions of acres of arable land causing billions of loss to agriculture sector in 2008.
Kishanganga dam excelled a step further in underscoring India’s grave violations of the IWT. The project envisions diversion from the Kishanganga River through a 22 kilometre long tunnel towards the Bunar Madumati Nullah of River Jehlum for 300 MW hydro-power generation and then its re-route to Jehlum via Wullar lake. The project also fulfills the gains from constructing Wullar Barrage on Wullar River that was objected to by Pakistan in 1985 resulting in halting of engineering work in 1987.
All kinds of diversion from the western rivers entering into Pakistan from IOK are absolutely barred in the IWT. Kishanganga River is termed as Neelum-Jehlum River when it enters Pakistani-administered Kashmir and is an input source of Pakistan’s 969 MW Neelum-Jehlum project.
The Indian design will drastically curtail the power generation from the project besides impacting severely on agriculture production and local demography. The construction work started in 2007 but stopped in October 2011 by the Court of Arbitration (CoA) under Pakistan’s request for arbitration. Some other projects on western rivers are also disputed between the nuclear-armed South Asian neighbours.
The treaty grapples with the challenge of climate change that was utterly unknown during its negotiating years (1954-1960); the deleterious effects of climate change were unimaginable at the time of signing moment of this historic accord.
The Swiss NE in Baghliar dam case Professor Raymond Laffitte also hinted and based his decision on multiple factors related to climate change. India, being the upper riparian, is in an advantageous position. The reduction in water flow owing to the causes of climate change must be shared by both the countries and not by Pakistan alone as in the past.
Former UNSC Secretary General, Boutros Ghali, once famously remarked during his tenure in 1991: “Wars will now be fought over water, neither politics nor oil.” His statement validates the current water conflict between Pakistan and India.
The incumbent Indian Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, has repeatedly threatened abrogation of IWT as well as stopping the flow of water into Pakistan territory. The successive Indian governments during the last 40 years have devised controversial projects on the upstream sides of the western rivers in absolute contradiction to the clauses of IWT. The third party dispute-settling mechanism by NE or CoA is also an exorbitant process draining millions of dollars out from the national exchequer.
India’s controversial step of annexing the occupied Kashmir last year has exacerbated the situation further. Though voices have been raised from both states in the recent past for revisiting/amending the treaty but in near future it seems almost impossible keeping in view their current state of bilateral relations. Evidently, the status quo will prevail in the years to come.
***The writer is Deputy Director at Pakistan Railways
